Charlotte Olympia Black Lion Sneakers low shipping fee cheap price very cheap authentic cheap price O9v1Qfmu2R

Charlotte Olympia Black Lion Sneakers low shipping fee cheap price very cheap authentic cheap price O9v1Qfmu2R
Charlotte Olympia Black Lion Sneakers

CIGISearch block

Innovation Productivity
The trade-off between incentives for inventors and deadweight losses for the economy from granting monopolies
Published: April 25, 2017

Key Points

he patent regime must be a central consideration of any modern innovation strategy. Patent rights influence, among other things, firms’ incentives to innovate, knowledge diffusion, market organization, public access to technology, exports and foreign direct investment. They can either promote or inhibit innovation, depending on the strength of the patent rights and the specifics of the regime.

There are two principal and diametrically opposite moral philosophies on patent rights. First, the "natural rights view" sees an innovation as naturally belonging to its creator, the party that had the inspiration and invested in its development. Under this view, any action other than assigning full rights to the inventor constitutes theft. The opposite philosophy, the "public rights view," is that knowledge and ideas belong in the public domain, for all to discuss, use and build on, and that the assignation of private property rights constitutes an improper restriction on the rights of the public. This view is grounded in the fact that the laws of nature that govern our world exist separately from humans, and that just because an individual was first to discover something should not mean that the individual gains ownership over it. Between these extreme positions is room for a system that both recognizes some rights for inventors and affirms that information and ideas fundamentally belong to all. Thus, the approach that most legal systems have adopted in practice is a utilitarian one, where the need to incentivize innovation is traded off against the need for public access. Such a utilitarian approach is doubly important because of innovation’s central role in driving improvement in our standard of living.

There are two principal and diametrically opposite moral philosophies on patent rights.

Patent rights can promote innovation in three main ways. First, they can facilitate knowledge diffusion because, as a condition of receiving a patent, inventors are required to describe the technology in sufficient detail so that someone skilled in the art can reproduce it. This requirement is long-standing. The first US patent act, passed by Congress in 1790, stipulated that a patent should “enable a workman or other person skilled in the art…to make, construct or use the same.” However, while facilitating diffusion may be a principal objective of patents, it does not seem to be an important mechanism in practice. Firms and their patent lawyers often obfuscate the workings of a technology in the patent’s description, and patent examiners rarely effectively enforce the full disclosure requirement. Furthermore, managers in major technology companies routinely instruct their engineers not to search the prior art in a given technological field to mitigate the risk of a willful infringement court ruling and its associated larger damages (Boldrin and Levine 2013). Surveys of inventors, such as a report by Industry, Science and Technology Canada (1989), have confirmed that high-tech firms do not consider patents to be a particularly useful source of new information.

The second way in which patent rights can promote innovation is by creating a market for ideas and innovation, thus facilitating transactions such as the licensing or sale of an innovation and enabling the efficient allocation of ideas and technology. Creative firms could focus on the development of technologies and allow other firms with comparatively better production, distribution or marketing capabilities to undertake the commercialization (Arrow 1962; Arora 1995; Gans and Stern 2003; Federal Trade Commission 2011). The extent to which patents foster innovation through this mechanism, while likely not negligible, remains an open question.

Third, and most importantly, they can increase the incentives for private agents to innovate by providing a higher return to innovation. This being the principal mechanism, it is examined in detail below.

Once the cost of developing knowledge has been incurred, there is zero additional cost to having more parties use that knowledge. (Photo: Lilyana Vynogradova /

Simple Model of Patents and Private Incentives to Innovate

Understanding why patents could be necessary to foster innovation by private agents begins with the recognition that knowledge is non-rivalrous. That is, the use of a given piece of knowledge by one party does not preclude another party from also using that same knowledge. Put differently, once the cost of developing knowledge has been incurred (perhaps by running experiments to discover the laws of nature or repeated trials to discover how to make a technology work), there is zero additional cost to having more parties use that knowledge. What’s more, knowledge is largely non-excludable. Once created, it is difficult to keep others from learning about and using the knowledge. This non-rivalrous, non-excludable nature of knowledge makes it a public good that can drive large increases in welfare. But, paradoxically, for the same reasons that it is so valuable to the public, knowledge can be underprovided by the market, or even not provided at all.

The fundamental problem is that when an innovation can be quickly imitated by others, any profit generated by the innovation is quickly eroded. Figure 1, Panel A, shows the market for a product that is the result of an innovation. If the marginal cost of providing one additional unit of the knowledge good is zero, and the good is non-excludable so that there is imitation, competition will ensure that the equilibrium price is zero. This equilibrium is good for consumers because all consumers who value the good receive it, and they get it for free. However, because there are no profits to be had for the original innovator, the innovator would optimally choose not to invest in the development of his or her idea in the first place.

The solution to this problem is to make innovations excludable. This is done in practice by granting and enforcing patents that cover such innovations. Because inventors now possess a monopoly on the use of the innovation, they will choose to sell the knowledge good at the price and make profit (the square labelled “Profit” in Panel B). To the extent that these monopoly rents cover their development costs, the inventor will undertake the development of their idea. Of course, giving inventors patent rights comes at a cost. In the new equilibrium, consumers must now pay to consume the knowledge good and are thus worse off. For consumers who still choose to consume the good, there is no adverse impact to overall welfare because the higher price simply results in a transfer from consumers to the innovator. However, consumers who value the knowledge good at less than the monopoly price will choose to consume the good, which leads to DWL for the economy and a lower welfare.

In summary, the simple model suggests that without patents there will be no innovation by private agents and the entire welfare associated with an innovation will be lost. With patents, innovators will mark up the price of their innovation, which results in not everyone accessing the innovation and thus lower welfare.

Figure 1: Market Equilibrium without Patents (Panel A) and with Patents (Panel B)
Source: Graphic provided by author. Notes: In Panel A, due to competition from imitators, consumers receive the knowledge good at a price zero, and the entire area under the demand curve is the consumers’ surplus (CS). In Panel B, consumers pay the monopoly price. This constitutes a transfer from consumers to the innovator, who makes a profit. The economy suffers DWL due to some consumers no longer consuming the good.

Optimal Patent Length

The primary drawback of patents, the associated DWL, can be limited by making a patent’s monopoly temporary. The trade-off is that limiting the term of patents weakens the incentives of inventors and that certain innovations, which from the point of view of social welfare should be undertaken, won’t be. Conversely, lengthening the term of patents will increase DWL on all innovations, including those that would have been undertaken even with the shorter patent term. As a result, the optimal term is a function of the distribution of ideas that could be developed into innovations.

As Figure 2 shows, some ideas are better than others in that they may cost less () to develop into a useful innovation, or because the innovation may generate more value (). Some ideas (for example, ) are very good in that they cost little and generate a lot of value. From the point of view of maximizing society’s welfare, all innovations that generate (net present) values greater than their costs should be developed (at least in the absence of DWL). In the figure, these innovations fall above the “Worthwhile ideas” line (all the ones labelled with a letter). However, because patents decentralize the decision of whether to pursue an innovation, not all of these ideas are going to be developed. In fact, even if patents are infinite, idea won’t be developed because its cost will exceed the inventor’s discounted stream of monopoly profits (as was shown in Figure 1, Panel B, even with a monopoly the inventor can only capture part of the value of the innovation). If patents are given a 20-year term, the net present value of an inventor’s profit stream is further lowered, so that now ideas and , too, will not be developed. If the patent term is futher reduced to five years, only idea will be developed.

The figure illustrates the basic trade-off between increasing the incentives of inventors so that more ideas are developed (by increasing the term) and decreasing the DWL associated with innovations that would have been developed regardless (by decreasing the term). In the figure, the optimality of a 10-year or 20-year term depends on whether the welfare gains generated by innovations and outweigh the larger welfare losses associated with a longer term on innovations , and . It is therefore impossible to determine the optimal patent term unless one has perfect information on the cost and value of every idea. But the figure illustrates that as the term lengthens, each subsequent increase is likely to generate fewer and fewer additional innovations (the cone between the 10- and 20-year patent lines is larger than the cone between the 20- and 30-year patent lines). Moreover, each subsequent increase of term raises the DWL on a larger number of patents. Therefore, one can expect significant welfare costs from increasing the patent term too much.

Figure 2: Trade-off between Shorter and Longer Patent Terms
Source: Graphic provided by author. Notes: Illustrative distribution of ideas in terms of cost to develop the idea (C) and the value of the ensuing innovation (V). Labelled ideas should be developed because their (net present) value exceeds their cost of development. However, inventors compare their net present profit stream to their cost. Longer patent terms result in more ideas being developed but greater DWL. Figure drawn approximately to scale for discount rate of 0.05.

Are Patents Really Necessary?

Importantly, the simple model assumes that innovations can be imitated quickly and at zero cost. In practice, it may take time for potential competitors to learn of the new innovation, let alone imitate it. This could give the original innovator a first-mover advantage that, even in the absence of patent rights, provides sufficient incentives for the inventor to develop his or her idea. Alternatively, if imitation costs are non-zero, the result would be limited entry, a positive equilibrium price and, potentially, sufficient profits for the inventor to cover development costs. Irrespective of the speed and cost of imitation, some markets may also have significant regulatory or other barriers to entry that limit competition and, thus, provide a profit for the innovator. Therefore, it may well be that, in practice, most innovation would occur even without the additional incentives of patents.

Patents are also not the only way to incentivize innovation. While patents have the advantage that they fully decentralize decision making and governments need not have knowledge of innovation opportunities or the value of innovations, and that under a patents regime the costs of development are ultimately borne by the innovation’s users and not by the public, patents are in general less efficient in terms of overall welfare than many alternative mechanisms to incentivize innovation.

Irrespective of the speed and cost of imitation, some markets may also have significant regulatory or other barriers to entry that limit competition and, thus, provide a profit for the innovator.

One alternative to patents, and a first-best from a welfare perspective, is for a sponsoring agency or government to offer the inventor a prize for producing the innovation. If the size of the prize is equal to the consumer surplus in Figure 1, Panel A, the prize has the added benefit that the inventor will choose to develop his or her idea into an innovation when it is socially optimal to do so (that is, when the cost of developing the innovation is less than the value that it generates) and will choose not to develop it otherwise. An additional benefit of this approach is that it can incentivize basic innovation and not just the applied variety, such as patents. Prizes are already being used effectively by groups such as the XPRIZE Foundation to spur innovation. And based on figures compiled by Dean Baker (2005), prizes or direct funding of research and development (RD) could be more effective than patents to spur pharmaceutical innovation. Baker notes that, in 2005, the United States spent US$210 billion on prescription drugs and estimates that the cost would have been closer to US$50 billion in the absence of patents. And this additional US$160 billion expenditure generated, at most, US$25 billion of RD spending (the total RD spending of the US pharmaceutical industry in 2005).

In addition to prizes and direct funding of RD, numerous related mechanisms for incentivizing innovation have been proposed, including buying out patents either through direct negotiation with the innovators or by determining the value of an innovation through a (shadow) auction of the innovation (Kremer 1998).


The model presented here makes the case that patents trade off DWL for increased innovation, and that there is an optimal patent term that achieves the best trade-off between them. However, patents are not the only way to incentivize innovation, nor are they necessary to obtain innovation in most practical cases. As a simplified model, it ignores the reality that innovation is cumulative and that firms respond not just to domestic intellectual property rights but also to the regimes in foreign countries. As another essay in this series will examine, in these more realistic scenarios, not only may patents not promote innovation, but they could even stifle it.

1 , c 7, § 2, 1 Stat 109.

2 This will be true as long as the distribution of ideas is relatively uniform over the / space. However, it could be the case that a disproportionately large number of ideas reside between the 20- and 30-year lines.

3 For example, in 1839 the inventors of photography sold the French government the rights to their innovation in an negotiation, and the technology was placed in the public domain (Newhouse 1988).

Works Cited

Arora, Ashish. 1995. “Licensing Tacit Knowledge: Intellectual Property Rights and the Market for Know-how.” 4 (1): 41–60.

Arrow, Kenneth. 1962. “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention.” In , 609–26. National Bureau of Economic Research Special Conference Series, Vol. 13. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Baker, Dean. 2005. “The Reform of Intellectual Property.” Center for Economic and Policy Research Report, July. .

Boldrin, Michele and David Levine. 2013. “The case against patents.” 27: 3–22.

Federal Trade Commission. 2011. . Washington, DC: Federal Trade Commission. .

Gans, Joshua S. and Scott Stern. 2003. “The product market and the market for ‘ideas’: commercialization strategies for technology entrepreneurs.” 32 (2): 333–50.

Industry, Science and Technology Canada. 1989. “Appendices for the Survey of Intellectual Property Rights in Canada: Final Report.” Unpublished manuscript.

Kremer, Michael R. 1998. “Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation.” 113 (4): 1137–68. .

Newhouse, Elizabeth L., ed. 1988. . Washington, DC: National Geographic Society.

The opinions expressed in this article/multimedia are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIGI or its Board of Directors.

Joël Blit is a CIGI senior fellow researching the topic of innovation, including exploring intellectual property rights, closing Canada’s innovation gap, and the link between Canadian immigration and innovation. Joël is assistant professor of economics at the University of Waterloo, with expertise in the economics of innovation, technology clusters, intellectual property, entrepreneurship, international trade and multinational corporations.

Return to cigi 2017
Read the series

In the Series

A foreword to the New Thinking on Innovation series
Free trade, intellectual property and the political economy of discourse
An alternative view of twenty-first-century economic partnership pacts
A clean break is needed to restore trust, but these stiff tests must be met
Original thinking about the theoretical landscape for national strategies that extends beyond new institutional economics
The changing geographies of research and innovation — and the implications for Canada
Why less can be more when it comes to intellectual property protection
Copyright policy in the public interest
How academic institutions can effectively leverage intellectual property
Innovating to alleviate public service pain points and enable agile procurement will do more to deliver prosperity than simply pouring more concrete
How to design a 2.0 intellectual property curriculum
For all but the largest countries, national patent regimes do little to promote innovation
Ambition, not just innovation, is needed to develop commercially viable solutions with the potential to scale globally
In a knowledge economy, countries that work hand in glove with their technology companies will see the greatest economic returns
New thinking on innovation, trade and productivity
South Korea, Japan and France have set an example others can follow
As fresh evidence emerges of a link between uncertainty and business pullback from research and development, here are four steps nations can take to unlock investment
The debate about public policies on emerging technologies needs to move beyond current echo chambers that alienate and exclude
An epilogue to the New Thinking on Innovation series

VIDEO: An Animated Look at Sovereign Patent Funds

This site uses cookies to provide the best online experience. By using this site, you agree to the use of cookies and collection of personal information per our Privacy Notice . To alter or disable the use of cookies, adjust your browser settings.

Who Are We?

We are the Centre for International Governance Innovation: an independent, non-partisan think tank with an objective and uniquely global perspective.

Language selection

Government of Canada

You’ll need to have your credentials assessed if you:

Credentials you got outside Canada will need to be assessed, such as:

Having your credentials assessed will help you:

You can start the process to get your credentials assessed and recognized before you arrive in Canada. This takes time and costs money.

To immigrate as a Federal Skilled Worker (FSW)

To apply to the Federal Skilled Worker Program (FSWP) , you must get Educational Credential Assessments (ECAs). This includes any of your completed foreign educational credentials, such as a:

We use ECAs to see if your credentials are valid and equal to a completed credential in Canada.

You’ll also need to have your skills and training assessed to work in certain jobs in Canada.

To work in some jobs in Canada, including certain trades

No matter which type of job you’re looking for, make sure you have the language skills needed. Even if you have the language skills you need to immigrate to Canada, those skills may not be strong enough to work in the job you want to have.

Find out more about improving your English or French .

There are two types of jobs in Canada:

Regulated jobs, including trades

Regulated jobs are controlled by provincial, territorial, and sometimes federal laws. They are governed by a regulatory body or apprenticeship authority.

Regulated jobs are also called:

They include jobs such as:

These jobs are regulated to:

About 20 per cent of jobs in Canada are regulated.

In Canada, some provinces and territories regulate some jobs and trades while others do not. If you have a licence to work in a province or territory, it may not be accepted in others.

Find out more about how to get your credentials assessed to work in Canada .

Regulatory bodies

A regulatory body usually assesses credential recognition. Check with the regulatory body or other group for your job to find out if you need to be assessed. They can tell you which credential assessment agency you should use.

You can find out how to contact your regulatory body on Job Bank . You can also check their website to find out more about:

Working in a regulated job in Canada

To work in aregulated joband use a regulated title, you must :

Each regulated job has its own requirements for getting a licence or certificate. Requirements for entry can be different between provinces and territories , but they usually include:

You’ll be evaluated on your own merits. Don’t compare your experience to someone else’s. Understand the requirements as they apply to your own case in the province or territory where you plan to work.


If you want to work in a trade, visit Red Seal for more details about the training, skills and experience you’ll need to meet.

Trades include jobs such as:

As a tradesperson, you may be eligible to immigrate through the Federal Skilled Trades Program .

Non-regulated occupations

Some employers need job applicants to be registered or certified by the relevant professional association. Having your credentials assessed and recognized helps Canadian employers understand what you’re qualified for.

Job requirements can vary greatly between employers. Be prepared to prove that you have the education or experience to do the job. You may have to:

A credential assessment agency can assess your educational credentials for a fee. You may include this information in your résumé or curriculum vitæ (CV).

Find out more about how to get your credentials assessed to work in Canada

To study

If you plan to study in Canada, you’ll need to have your educational credentials assessed.

Some post-secondary schools can do the assessment. In other cases you’ll need to go to an assessment agency .

Contact the post-secondary school you want to go to in Canada to find out what kind of assessment they need and accept. Then, contact the assessment agency recommended by the school you want to attend, if needed.

Assessment agencies:

There are separate processes for having your educational credentials recognized for:

When you are talking about immigration in Canada, these words have certain meanings:

Credentials refer to

Qualifications refers to your combined

These will show if you are qualified to perform a certain job.

Competencies refer to things that you have learned. They include

don’t guarantee

Find us on 2018 New listing woman shoes 908 series cushioning woman sneakers woman casual shoes size 3640 low shipping fee online PyUlCyN

Google Plus Black leather Kurt Bernard Derby shoes online Shop pZ97yosp
Twitter sale choice Light pink canvas Chuck Taylor All Star trainers buy cheap collections supply for sale discount collections oo200tETa
LEO STUDIO DESIGN Sandals shop for Xcc1dVlm

Copyright © 2018 - cheap sale outlet store Space Black/Midnight Knit Sneaker new fashion Style cheap online Manchester online 1fssdqA

U.S. Patents No. 7,599,930 B1; 7,827,125 and 7,836,060 - V: 2018.10.0.34-310 - - Looking for Monster Cable ?